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Abstract
This paper studies shareholder engagement in companies’ strategic decisions.
Differences of objective among shareholders arise in our model due to the
presence of socially responsible investors. These investors take externali-
ties into account when valuing their portfolio while conventional investors
do not. Shareholders may affect corporate behavior via two mechanisms.
They can vote with their feet: responsible investors may shy away from
firms producing negative externalities, thereby raising their cost of capital.
Investors can also engage in activism. Our main contribution is to show that
a large activist investor can generate positive abnormal returns by investing
in non-responsible companies and turning them into responsible. We call this
strategy the “Washing Machine” and show that its successful implementa-
tion relies on a long-term horizon and a credible pro-social orientation.
Keywords: Asset pricing, corporate social responsibility, socially re-
sponsible investments, corporate engagement, shareholder activism.
JEL Classification: G34, H23
1 Introduction
Socially responsible investors constitute an important part of today’s finan-
cial markets. According to the Social Investment Forum, about 11% of assets
under management in the US is managed following this investment style. In
Europe, this percentage has been growing at a fast pace to reach 17% of as-
sets under management according to Eurosif. Socially responsible investors
base their decisions not only on financial analysis but also on environmental,
social, and governance criteria. Indeed, corporations produce positive and
negative externalities that they do not usually internalize, because they do
not translate into corporations’ incomes and costs. Typical positive exter-
nalities can be found in the management of human resources (training to
acquire skills that can be valued by other employers), or in the investment
in R&D (production of non-patentable knowledge). But firms also produce
negative externalities (pollution, health hazard,...).
Public institutions recommended by economists, such as Pigouvian taxes
for example, have only partially reduced the inefficiencies in the allocation of
resources that these externalities have generated in the economy. On the top
of these institutions, the objective of socially responsible investors is to offer
an appropriate long-run financial performance and to induce corporations
to internalize the externalities they exert on Society. This is done by using
extra-financial performance indices in the determination of their portfolio
allocation.
In this paper, we examine the conditions under which socially responsible
investors (hereafter, SR investors) could induce corporations to behave more
responsibly. Externalities produced by firms are valued by SR investors in
proportion of their investment in these firms. Such investors thus vote with
their feet (in spirit of Edmans (2009)).1 By altering their portfolio allocation
towards responsible assets, these investors can decrease the equilibrium cost
of capital of responsible firms, thereby inducing firms to behave more respon-
sibly. This is in line with the empirical results of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)
who show that vice assets enjoy a higher risk-adjusted return than other as-
1Voting-with-your-feet strategies as opposed to monitoring have been theoretically
studied by Maug (1998) and Edmans and Manso (2011), and empirically documented
by Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2002) and by Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2012). We comple-
ment these analysis by considering a setting in which the private benefit of control derives
from the fact that some investors value the externalities imposed by firms on society.
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sets. This strategy can be counterbalanced by purely financial investors who
shy away from responsible companies which offer lower expected returns.
Our model analyzes when socially responsible corporations are more highly
valued than non-responsible ones in the financial markets. To better under-
stand the relationship between corporate behavior and investors’ strategies,
we explicitly consider that investors vote on (or may influence) corporate
decisions. This enables us to study how shareholders’ engagement affects
firm value. In particular, we analyze the optimal strategy and financial per-
formance of an activist investor who is large enough to influence corporate
decisions.
Our main finding is that, in presence of socially responsible investors,
a credible pro-social orientation and a long-term horizon may increase the
purely financial return of an activist shareholder. The activist’s strategy, that
we name the “Washing Machine” consists in buying a non-responsible firm,
turning it into responsible, and selling it back to the market. The abnormal
return derives from the fact that SR investors are ready to pay a premium for
holding the shares of socially responsible firms. Such a strategy could not be
successfully implemented by a short-term investor nor by a purely financially-
motivated activist. First, a short-term investor could not credibly commit
to keep his stake in the company long enough to implement the responsible
strategy. Second, a purely financially-motivated activist could not credibly
announce that he will support the pro-social corporate strategy over the long
run. Indeed, he would always prefer to vote in favor of the non-responsible
corporate strategy. As a result a purely financially-motivated activist would
not display abnormal returns.
This finding that active shareholder engagement with firms on pro-social
issues may be profitable is in line with recent evidence provided by Dimson,
Karakas, and Li (2012). They investigate the engagement behavior (mostly
done via discussions with firms) of a “large institutional investor with a major
commitment to responsible investment”. They document a 1.8% annual ab-
normal return after initial engagement. Successful engagement is associated
with a 4.4% abnormal return, with governance and climate change engage-
ments exhibiting the largest positive returns. These results complement those
obtained by Barber (2007) and Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) on
the impact of shareholder activism centered on governance issues. Barber
(2007) indicates that Calpers’ engagement generated a significant increase in
shareholder value. Becht et al. (2009) find that the Hermes UK focus fund
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generates positive abnormal return thanks to its engagement policy.
We identify three conditions for the “Washing Machine” strategy to be
successful. First, investors implementing this strategy must be able to ac-
quire a significant influence on target companies. Otherwise, they will not
be in a position to impose the necessary changes. The “Washing Machine”
strategy is thus well suited for investors that are ready to take large stakes in
companies, such as private equity funds, hedge fund, or wealthy individuals.
But it is also attainable by a group of investors, such as mutual funds or
pension funds, who do not individually hold large blocks. In this case, a
successful implementation of engagement relies on a sufficiently coordinated
policy of engagement (e.g., voting at general meetings). Second, only in-
vestors with a long-term outlook can implement this strategy. Indeed, they
must be able to credibly commit to remain involved in the business long
enough for its level of CSR to improve. And third, the fund must be able
to provide guarantees of credibility with regard to CSR. Otherwise, it will
fail to convince the market of the reality of the commitments made by the
company: when trying to sell back part of the company, the market will value
it as a dirty rather than as a clean one.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the “Washing Machine” investment
strategy is not science fiction. Indeed, a fund is currently being launched
by Tau Asset Management with the objective of buying into pretty non-
responsible businesses (garment factories in developing countries) and im-
proving social and environmental corporate behaviors in an attempt to best
prepare a future listing in financial markets.2 Only time will say whether
or not this new investment venture is going to be successful but its invest-
ment philosophy embeds the ingredients for success that we identified for the
“Washing Machine” strategy.
The literature on the pricing implications of socially responsible investors
starts with the seminal contribution of Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001).
They study an asset pricing model in which some investors exclude non-
responsible assets from their investment universe. These non-responsible
assets then enjoy a higher risk premium because their risk is borne by fewer
investors. This analysis has been extended in several directions. Barnea,
Heinkel, and Kraus (2005) study equilibrium investments in various indus-
2Jessica Wohl, Reuters Ed. US, NY firm sees investment opportunity in garment fac-
tories, September 27th, 2013.
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tries according to their level of social responsibility. They show that non-
responsible industries receive less capital thereby inducing a lower level of
investments in the economy. Baron (2007) models socially responsible activ-
ities as donations. He then studies an economy in which not only firms but
also individuals can make such donations. In this context, he shows that the
cost of CSR is borne by social entrepreneurs, who suffer from the lower valu-
ation of their companies when they take them public, but not by subsequent
shareholders who earn the adequate risk-adjusted return. We complement
this literature i) by showing how socially responsible investors can affect cor-
porate strategy via voting (or via engagement), and ii) by analyzing how an
activist investors can design profitable and socially effective strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
baseline model and equilibrium concept with competitive investors. Section
3 studies the impact of a large raider. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model and equilibrium with atomistic in-
vestors
Consider an economy with three dates and one firm. Firm’s assets are as-
sumed to already be in place. They initially belong to the owner of the firm,
who sell them to atomistic investors at date 1. The risk-free rate is normal-
ized to 0. At date 3, the firm yields a random financial return r per share.
The return r is normally distributed with mean Er, and variance σ2. There
is a continuum of investors indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] with a mass of one such that∫ 1
0
di = 1. Investors have a utility function U (X) = −e−AX , in which A > 0
represents the constant absolute risk aversion parameter. Investors initially
hold no cash and no shares. We denote by hi the number of shares held by
investor i after trading at date 1. We assume that short-selling positions
are allowed. The number of firm’s shares is normalized to 1, so that the
market-clearing condition is
∫ 1
0
hidi = 1. Investor i’s final wealth is written
Wi = hi (r − P ) , where P is the unit price of the firm’s shares ex ante.
At date 2, the firm is confronted with a choice between two alternative
strategies. Strategy s = 0 has no social externality and its expected return
is Er (s = 0) = µ > 0. Strategy s = 1 generates a social externality which is
valued at e > 0 units of numeraire per share. The firm’s expected (financial)
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return if the responsible strategy s = 1 is adopted is Er (s = 1) = µ − c, in
which c > 0 represents firm’s financial cost of implementing the pro-social
activity. Another interpretation is that c is the cost to incur in order to reduce
a negative externality by e. We assume that e > c so that the responsible
strategy is desirable from a social point of view.
Investors differ upon their socially responsible orientation. When they
evaluate the performance of their investment, socially responsible (SR) in-
vestors internalize both the financial and the extra-financial returns. This
means that they evaluate the return per share as µ − c − P + e for the re-
sponsible firm, and µ − P for the firm implementing strategy s = 0. Our
interpretation is that SR investors are altruistic and internalize the social im-
pact of their investments. Other investors referred to as traditional investors
do not value the externality. We use the dummy variable xi to express pro-
social values, where xi takes value 1 if investor i is socially responsible, and
0 otherwise.3 SR investors constitute a proportion pi of the investors, which
means that
∫
xidi = pi.
2.1 Demand and price with and without corporate re-
sponsibility
The demand for firm’s shares and the equilibrium price are a function of
investors’ expectations about firm’s behavior. Let’s first consider the simple
case where investors expect that the firm will not adopt a pro-social behavior:
s = 0. Thus, all investors solve the same one-riskfree-one-risky portfolio
choice problem in which we know that the Arrow-Pratt approximation for
the certainty equivalent final wealth is exact. Thus, they all select h that
maximizes the certainty equivalent final wealth, which equals hi(µ − P ) −
0.5h2iσ
2A. This yields h∗i (s = 0) = (µ − P )/Aσ2. The market-clearing
condition implies that h∗i = 1 for all i, which implies that
P (s = 0) = µ− Aσ2. (1)
Since the firm generates no externality, the pricing equation reflects only the
risk-return tradeoff, and the holding equation indicates that all agents hold
3We obtain similar results by allowing xi to belong to interval [0, 1], in which case xi
can be interpreted as an index of altruism.
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the same portfolio. We suppose that µ − Aσ2 is positive, so that the value
of the firm is positive even without investing responsibly.
Suppose alternatively that investors believe that the firm will adopt the
responsible behavior. Investor i’s optimization program is:
max
hi
EU((r − c− P + xie)hi) = U((µ− c− P + xie)hi − 0.5Ah2iσ2).
It yields the following demand for firm’s shares:
hi =
µ− c+ xie− P
Aσ2
. (2)
Market-clearing imposes
∫ 1
0
hidi = 1. The firm’s share price is thus equal to:
P (s = 1) = µ− Aσ2 + pie− c. (3)
As before, this pricing equation reflects the basic tradeoff between return
and risk: the share price equals the expected return corrected for risk (dis-
counted at the risk-free rate of zero). One difference with a classic asset
pricing formula is the fact that, due to responsible investors, the share price
incorporates part of the firm’s externality. Equation (3) means that the
expected financial return of the firm, Er(s = 1)− P, is equal to Aσ2 − pie.
At equilibrium, after-trading holdings are given by:
hi (s = 1) = 1 +
(xi − pi)e
Aσ2
, for all i. (4)
The responsible investors invest more in the responsible firm than non-
responsible investors. The absence of full polarization of portfolio structures
between responsible and traditional investors comes from risk aversion. The
additional investment in the responsible firm’s shares increases with the level
of the positive externality and decreases with their level of risk aversion and
the level of risk. This result is in line with the empirical evidence offered by
Edmans (2011) showing that socially responsible funds increase their hold-
ings of firms that appear in the list of Fortune’s “Best Companies to Work
For”. Equation (4) also tells us that the pro-social behavior of altruistic
investors is partially offset by the purely financial investors. Indeed, agents
with xi = 0 have a demand for the responsible firm that is smaller than for
an irresponsible firm at equilibrium. This is due to the price effect of the
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reduced demand by altruistic investors. The opportunistic behavior of non-
altruistic investors dampens the impact SR investors on the cost of capital
of responsible firms.
The above pricing and holdings equations suggest that responsible in-
vestors can display a higher expected rate of return than no-responsible ones.
Indeed, responsible investors invest more in the responsible firm. If we as-
sume that Aσ2 − pie is positive, responsible firms yield a rate of financial
return that is larger than the riskfree rate. Thus, responsible investors se-
lect a riskier portfolio yielding a larger expected financial return. But firm’s
equity return does not compensate enough for the risk. The risk adjusted
performance of responsible investors will appear lower. However, responsi-
ble investors receive an additional compensation from the social return (the
positive externality) generated by the firm.
Our pricing results (1) and (3) show that the firm’s share price is higher
when the socially responsible strategy is adopted if and only if pie > c, that
is, if the proportion of responsible investors and the size of the externality
are sufficiently high, and if the cost of implementing the pro-social strategy is
low enough.4 Otherwise, the market value of the responsible firm is smaller.
This result can explain why extant empirical studies disagree on the impact
of CSR on firm value (see, for example, Wagner (2001), Orlitzky, Schmidt,
and Rynes (2003), Bauer, Koedijk, and R. Otten (2005), Geczy, Stambaugh,
and Levin (2005), and Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007)).
2.2 Voting-with-our-feet equilibrium
In this section, we assume that before selling the firm, the initial owner is
able to fix the firm’s responsibility status s irreversibly. Once s is selected,
the owner sells the firm to atomistic investors who cannot change s. This
implies that the initial owner of the firm selects the degree of corporate
responsibility to maximize its market value. The owner knows that, if the
pro-social investment is not performed, responsible investors will reduce their
demand for its shares. This has an adverse effect on its market value and on
4If the price adjustment is gradual, socially responsible assets might enjoy a superior
perfor- mance than non-responsible ones during the adjustment period (see, for example,
Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, and Koedijk (2010), and Edmans (2011) for empirical evidence
consistent with this idea).
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its cost of capital, which has to be weighted with the cost c to invest more
responsibly.
Definition 1 A voting-with-our-feet equilibrium is defined by a vector (P ∗, s∗, h∗i )
such that
1. Optimal portfolio allocation: h∗i ∈ arg maxEU ((r − P ∗ + s∗(xie− c))hi);
2. Market clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
h∗i di = 1;
3. The firm invests responsibly if it increases its market value: s∗ = 1 iff
P (s = 1) > P (s = 0).
We have seen above that the market value of the firm is µ−Aσ2 +pie− c
and µ − Aσ2 respectively if it invests responsibly or not. Thus, we obtain
that s∗ = 1 if and only if pie is larger than c, or pi ≥ c/e. This is the case
if the proportion of responsible investors is large, or if the social benefit to
cost ratio is large.
Proposition 1 There are two possible voting-with-our-feet equilibria:
• The SR equilibrium in which the firm behaves responsibly, P ∗ = µ −
Aσ2 + pie − c, and responsible investors hold more of the firm’s equity
in their portfolio than the traditional investors.
• The non-SR equilibrium in which the firm does not behave responsibly,
P ∗ = µ− Aσ2, and all investors hold the same portfolio.
When pi is larger (resp. smaller) than c/e, the SR (resp. non-SR) equi-
librium exists.
The underlying incentive mechanism is simple: the credible threat of
responsible investors to reduce their investment in the firm if it does not
behave responsibly provides an incentive for corporate social responsibility.
Indeed, it reduces the market value of irresponsible firms. In other words,
it raises their cost of capital. This effect has been studied theoretically by
Heinkel et al. (2001) and empirically by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). The
incentive scheme is made stronger when the proportion of pro-social investors
increases on the market. Notice however that the incentive is too weak in
8
the sense that it may be possible that a socially desirable investment (e > c)
is not implemented because doing so would reduce the market value of the
firm (pie < c).
We can try to give numbers here. In the Stern Review (2006), the dam-
ages generated by the emission of greenhouse gases in the business-as-usual
scenario are estimated to be equivalent to an immediate and permanent loss
of the world GDP by an amount comprised between 5% and 20%. To fix
ideas, let us consider the middle e = 12.5% of this interval. At the same
time, Stern estimates that most of these consequences could be eliminated
by sacrificing immediately and permanently 1% of the world GDP, invested in
alternative/new technologies to reduce emissions. Thus, for the application of
climate change, we can estimate the ratio c/e around 8%. This suggests that
social efficiency could be obtained in the voting-with-our-feet equilibrium if
the proportion of altruistic investors is larger than 8%.
2.3 Equilibria with shareholders’ vote
Investors can vote with their feet but they can also intervene directly through
shareholder meetings. To make this possible, let us modify the timing of the
game. The initial owner of the firm cannot irreversibly select s ex ante. This
assumption is of interest because it is likely that implementing a corporate
strategy takes time and should be undertaken on a progressive basis.
We take these effects into account by considering the following timing.
At date 1, investors purchase the firm’s shares at price P . At date 2, the
general assembly of the corporation votes on a proposal to invest more or
less responsibly on the basis of one-share-one-vote. At date 3, returns are
realized. We denote by vi the vote of agent i for each share he holds in the
firm. vi = 1 corresponds to a vote in favor of s = 1 and vi = 0 to a vote
in favor of s = 0. The aggregate vote in favor of strategy s = 1 is defined
as v =
∫ 1
0
vihidi. The majority rule implies that, if v ≥ 12 , the pro-social
strategy s = 1 is adopted. Otherwise, the firm adopts the purely financial
strategy.
Since investors are atomistic, they are never pivotal in the vote on corpo-
rate strategy. As a result, any voting outcome can be sustained at equilib-
rium. However, investors have rational expectations and anticipate what the
outcome of the vote will be depending on the proportion of the various types
of investors in the firm’s capital. This enables them to derive their demand
9
for assets. We assume that, at equilibrium, investors coordinate on the same
equilibrium.
To restrict the set of equilibria, we define an intuitive voting strategy as
a voting rule in which investors vote according to their social orientations:
responsible investors vote for the pro-social strategy s = 1 while traditional
investors vote for the purely financial strategy s = 0.
Definition 2 A shareholder-vote equilibrium is defined by a vector (P ∗, s∗, h∗i , v
∗
i )
such that
1. Optimal portfolio allocation: for all i, h∗i ∈ arg maxEU ((r − P ∗ + s∗(xie− c))hi);
2. Market clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
h∗i di = 1;
3. Corporate strategy of the firm: s∗ = 1 if v∗ =
∫ 1
0
v∗i h
∗
i di ≥ 12 , and s∗ = 0
otherwise, with v∗i = xi.
Condition 1 states that the two types of investors are choosing optimal
portfolios given the corporate strategy that is expected to be selected at equi-
librium. Condition 2 is the market clearing condition. Condition 3 indicates
that we focus on equilibria with intuitive voting strategies.
Let us consider first the equilibrium in which it is expected that the
proposal to invest more responsibly will be defeated at the general assembly.
As we already know, this implies that all investors, socially responsible or
not, hold one share h∗i = 1 of the firm, which implies that P
∗ = µ − Aσ2.
We now verify under what condition this equilibrium exists. To do so, we
need to verify that the condition v∗ < 1
2
holds. Because all investors hold
the same number of shares, the proportion of votes in favor of the pro-social
strategy is the same as the proportion of socially responsible agents in the
economy. Thus, s∗ = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if pi is smaller than 1/2.
The equilibrium in which the firm chooses the purely financial strategy exists
if and only if a majority of investors is not responsible.
Let us now consider the alternative equilibrium in which it is expected
that the proposal to invest more responsibly will get a majority vote at the
general assembly. We know that this implies that
h∗i = 1 +
(xi − pi) e
Aσ2
, (5)
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and
P ∗ = µ− Aσ2 + pie− c.
The proportion of votes in favour of social responsibility is thus equal to
v∗ =
∫
xih
∗
i di = pi
(
1 +
(1− pi) e
Aσ2
)
. (6)
Thus, a shareholder-vote equilibrium inducing the firm to behave responsibly
exists iff v∗ defined by (6) is larger than 1/2. From equation (6), we see
that the proportion v∗ of shares held by responsible investors is larger than
their proportion pi on the market, since they hold proportionally more of
the responsible asset in their portfolio. Thus it may be possible that the
pro-social proposal succeeds in the general assembly in spite of the fact that
there is a minority of responsible agents on the market. This is more likely
to be the case if e/Aσ2 is large.
Proposition 2 The two possible shareholder-vote equilibria are the SR and
non-SR equilibrium described in Proposition (1). When v∗, which is defined
by (6), is smaller than 1/2, only the non-SR equilibrium exists. When pi is
larger than 1/2, only the SR-equilibrium exists . Finally, when pi ≤ 1/2 ≤ v∗,
the two equilibria coexists.
When pi ∈
[
1
2
(
1 + (1−pi)e
Aσ2
)−1
, 1
2
]
, the two intuitive equilibria character-
ized above exist; the prevalence of one equilibrium instead of another depends
on whether investors coordinate their anticipations on the responsible strat-
egy being chosen or not.
3 Engagement by a large investor
This section studies what could be the role and financial performance of a
large investor, referred to as a raider, who stands ready to hold large stakes
in firms.
We introduce a date 0 in our model. We assume that the initial owner
wants to sell the assets for exogenous liquidity reasons at date 0 to the raider
or at date 1 to the atomistic investors. The formal objective of the initial
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owner of the firm is to maximize the proceeds from sales by choosing the date
at which the sale occurs. If the sale occurs at date 0, the initial owner gets P0
from the raider. If the initial owner sells at date 1 directly to investors, the
owner gets P1 (we do not need to introduce any expectation operator since,
at equilibrium, P1 is perfectly anticipated), with P1 being determined as in
the previous section. As before, P1 depends on whether responsible investors
have or not a majority of votes. Dates 1, 2, and 3 proceed as in section 2.3.
At date 0, the risk-neutral raider stands ready to acquire the firm’s finan-
cial assets. In order to do so, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the 100%
of the shares to the initial owner.5 His level of social responsibility is denoted
by θ ∈ [0, 1], where θ represents the proportion of the externality that he
internalizes. We denote by 1−α the proportion of the firm’s shares that the
raider resells at date 1 at a price denoted P1. The remaining α shares are
held up to date 3. The α shares entitle the raider to vote on firm’s corporate
strategy at date 2. His vote is denoted V , with V = 1 if the raider votes
for the responsible strategy and V = 0 otherwise. EtUR represents raider’s
expected utility conditional on information available at date t. Raider’s ex-
pected utility at date 2 is E2UR = (1− α)P1 + α (µ+ s(θe− c))− P0: After
purchasing the firm at price P0, he sells a fraction 1 − α at price P1 and
retains a fraction α, whose expected return is µ if the firm does not behave
responsibly. It it does, the financial return is reduced by c. But the raider
also takes into account of a fraction θ of the extra-financial return e of its
investment in that case.
Definition 3 A strategic-raider equilibrium is defined by a vector (P ∗0 , P
∗
1 , s
∗, α∗, h∗i , v
∗
i , V
∗)
such that
1. Atomistic investors’ optimal portfolio allocation:
for all i, h∗i ∈ arg maxEU ((r − P ∗1 + s∗(xie− c))hi);
2. Market clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
h∗i di = 1− α∗;
3. Corporate strategy of the firm: s∗ = 1 if v∗ = α∗V ∗ +
∫ 1
0
v∗i h
∗
i di ≥ 12 ,
and s∗ = 0 otherwise, with v∗i = xi.
5The initial owner not being atomistic alleviates the free-rider problem, analyzed by
Grossman and Hart (1980), that a raider would face when trying to buy shares from atom-
istic investors. In order to solve this free-rider problem, we could have instead considered
that the raider’s offer is conditional on the fact that all shares are tendered.
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4. Take-it-or-leave-it offer from the raider to the initial owner: P ∗0 = P
∗,
where P ∗ is the shareholder-vote equilibrium price absent of the raider,
as characterized in Proposition 2;
5. Large investor’s optimal portfolio allocation: α∗ ∈ arg maxE1UR (s∗) ;
6. Large investor’s voting strategy: V ∗ = 1 if E2UR (s∗ = 1) ≥ E2UR (s∗ = 0),
and V ∗ = 0 otherwise.
The first three conditions are interpreted as in the previous section. A
difference is that the number of shares available for investors is 1−α instead
of 1. This changes the risk premium and the level of investors’ holdings in
the firm. Condition 4 indicates that the raider proposes the initial owner a
price that equals the amount the owner would get if he were to sell shares
directly to investors at date 1 (P ∗ is the same than in the previous section).6
Condition 5 indicates that the raider chooses at date 1 how many shares
he wants to hold up to date 3 such that he maximizes his expected utility
(anticipating the strategy that is adopted at date 2). Finally, condition 6
indicates that, contrary to the atomistic non-pivotal voters, the raider votes
at date 2 for the strategy that maximizes his expected utility. We solve for
the intuitive equilibrium by backward induction.
At date 2, the raider holds α∗ shares, responsible investors hold
∫
xih
∗
i di,
and traditional investors hold the remaining shares. Raider’s expected utility
is E2UR = (1− α∗)P ∗1 + α∗ (µ+ s∗(θe− c))− P ∗0 . If the raider is pivotal, he
votes in favor of the responsible strategy if and only if:
(1− α∗)P ∗1 + α∗ (µ+ θe− c)− P ∗0 ≥ (1− α∗)P ∗1 + α∗µ− P ∗0 ,
or equivalently, if θe ≥ c, or θ ≥ c/e. This inequality suggests that, at
the voting stage, the raider votes in favor of the responsible strategy if he is
sufficiently responsible and if the social cost to benefit ratio of the responsible
investment is sufficiently low. Indeed, since it is financially damaging to
implement the socially responsible strategy, the raider votes in favor of this
strategy only if he experiences enough additional utility or perceived benefits
from the increase in social responsibility.
6The take-it or leave-it offer gives all the bargaining power to the raider. Other less
extreme bargaining mechanisms would leave some surplus to the initial owner. This issue
is not important from a theoretical viewpoint since all the results in this section hold as
long as the raider captures some of the surplus.
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3.1 Large investor’s engagement towards more respon-
sibility: The “Washing Machine” investment strat-
egy
We focus first on the case in which pi (1 + (1− pi) e/Aσ2) < 0.5. From Propo-
sition 2, absent raider’s intervention, the responsible strategy is not adopted
at the intuitive shareholder-vote equilibrium. In this case, the raider may
implement what we call the “Washing Machine” strategy: buying a non-
responsible strategy, turning it into responsible, and reselling (part of) it on
the market. This strategy is of interest because the raider can propose to
acquire the firm at a pretty low price:
P ∗0 = µ− Aσ2. (7)
The initial owner cannot do better than accepting the offer, since µ − Aσ2
is the competitive price when the firm does not invest responsibly, in the
absence of the large investor.
As a benchmark, we first consider an equilibrium in which the raider
purchases the firm but votes against the responsible investment. As shown
at the end of the previous section, such a strategy is credible if and only
if θ < c/e. Because of the risk aversion of atomistic investors, it is an
equilibrium that they do not purchase any share from the raider at date 1,
which is sustained by price P ∗1 = µ. So, the raider just takes advantage here
of its risk-neutrality to purchase at price µ − Aσ2 something that it values
at µ. This equilibrium is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that pi (1 + (1− pi) e/Aσ2) < 0.5 and θ < c/e. Then,
the strategic-raider equilibrium is such that
• (date 0) The initial owner sells the firm to the large investor at the low
price P ∗0 = µ− Aσ2;
• (date 1) The large investor does not sell shares at date 1, and the price
of shares is P ∗1 = µ. Atomistic investors do not hold shares of the
firm;
• (date 2) The large investor does not adopt the socially responsible strat-
egy;
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• The equilibrium expected profit for the large investor is
E1UR = Aσ2 ≥ 0. (8)
We hereafter examine the more interesting case in which the large investor
holds enough shares of the firm and has a large enough social orientation to
reverse the majority in favour of investing responsibly. Suppose that all
investors anticipate this. As observed above, this equilibrium requires that
θe be larger than c, otherwise the large investor will never vote in favor of
more responsibility.
Anticipating the majority vote in favour of the responsible investment,
the market equilibrium price and holdings at date 1 are given by h∗i = 1 −
α + (xi − pi) e/Aσ2, for all i, and
P ∗1 = µ− (1− α)Aσ2 + pie− c. (9)
At date 1, because the raider expects to be pivotal and change the firm’s
strategy towards more responsibility, his expected utility is given by E1UR =
(1− α)P ∗1 + α (µ+ θe− c)− P ∗0 . In this case, the optimal amount of shares
that he keeps after trading at date 1 is the one that maximizes E1UR. Re-
placing P ∗1 by its expression above and solving yields
1− α∗ = (pi − θ)e
2Aσ2
. (10)
When θ = pi, we obtain that α∗ = 1. Indeed, this is a situation in which
the expected total return of the firm is evaluated in the same way by the
two types of SR investors. Because atomistic ones are risk-averse, the only
possible equilibrium price is P ∗1 = µ + θe − c, and atomistic investors have
a zero net demand for the firm’s shares. The large investor sells some of its
shares at date 1 only if its social orientation θ is smaller than the proportion
pi of responsible agents in the population of atomistic investors. This is a
situation in which the relatively lower degree of social orientation of the large
investor induces it to sell some of its shares to those who value them more.
The risk aversion of atomistic investors limits this transfer of risk from the
risk-neutral raider. The larger the difference pi − θ or the smaller the risk
premium Aσ2, the smaller is the share α∗ of the firm retained by the large
investor.
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We need to check whether there is a majority in favor of the responsible
strategy of the firm at date 2. This is the case if
α∗ +
∫
xih
∗
i di ≥
1
2
.
This inequality may be rewritten as
1− (pi − θ)e
2Aσ2
+ pi
(pi − θ)e
2Aσ2
+ pi
(1− pi)e
Aσ2
≥ 1
2
.
This is equivalent to
−(1− pi)(pi + θ)e
2Aσ2
≤ 1
2
,
which is always true. Thus, equation (10) characterizes the optimal holding
strategy of the large investor, which implies that the firm always behaves
responsibly.
Proposition 4 Suppose that pi (1 + (1− pi) e/Aσ2) < 0.5 and θ ≥ c/e. Then,
the strategic-raider equilibrium is such that
• (date 0) The initial owner sells the firm to the large investor at the low
price P ∗0 = µ− Aσ2;
• (date 1) The large investor sells a fraction 1− α∗ = (pi − θ)e/2Aσ2 of
the firm to atomistic investors at price
P ∗1 = µ− c+ 0.5(pi + θ)e.
Atomistic investor i holds a fraction h∗i = (xi − 0.5(pi + θ)) e/Aσ2 of
the firm;
• (date 2) Responsible atomistic investors and the large investor vote in
favor of the proposal to adopt the responsible strategy, which gets the
majority;
• The equilibrium expected profit for the large investor is
E1UR = Aσ2 + (θe− c) + (pi − θ)
2e2
4Aσ2
≥ 0. (11)
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The expected total profit of the large investor is expressed in equation
(11). The first source of profit is the risk premium Aσ2 that is ripped from the
initial take-it-or-leave-it offer, as in the strategic-raider equilibrium without
majority reversal. The net benefit of the majority-reversal strategy V ∗ = 1 is
thus obtained by comparing this expected profit described by equations (11)
and (8). For the raider, the total benefit from the majority-reversal strategy
is thus:
(θe− c) + (pi − θ)
2e2
4Aσ2
≥ 0. (12)
The first term of the left hand-side of this inequality represents the raider’s
utility gain from making the firm socially responsible. The second term is
the responsibility premium, i.e., the capital gain made by the raider when he
sells back shares on the market at date 1 given his credible commitment to
vote in favor of more corporate social responsibility. They are both positive.
It can be positive even for the case in which θe is smaller than c. However, in
this case, the large investor is unable to credibly commit on the strategy to
vote in favor of corporate social responsibility. Atomistic responsible investors
know this and reduce their demand for the asset at date 1. This eliminates
the possibility to extract the responsibility premium.
Observe also that an increase in the social orientation of the large in-
vestor may increase its purely financial profit. There is an upward jump in
profitability when θ increases from below to above the threshold c/e. If the
raider is not sufficiently socially responsible, θ < c/e, he votes for the non-
responsible strategy at date 2. This is rationally anticipated by investors at
date 1. As a consequence, the price of shares at date 1 is not high enough to
induce the raider to sell any of his shares: he keeps his entire holdings up to
date 3 and has an expected wealth of Aσ2. If instead the raider is sufficiently
socially responsible, θ ≥ c/e, he votes for the responsible strategy at date 2.
Anticipating this, investors are ready to pay a high price to buy the shares
at date 1. The raider then sells an amount 1−α∗ = (pi− θ)e/2Aσ2 at date 1
to benefit from this high price. In general, he cannot sell his entire holdings
for two reasons. 7 On the one hand, if he sells a lot of shares on the market,
7We could have included an additional date of trading after the vote without affecting
our conclusions. In this case, the raider sell his remaining stake of the firm at this last
date of trading because there are no control issues left. This would occur if investors are
ready to pay a price that is high enough, i.e., if their level of social responsibility is high
enough to compensate for their risk aversion.
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investors have to bear more risk and this reduces the price. On the other
hand, if he sells too many shares, he is no more pivotal. The optimal finan-
cial performance of the large investor is increased by (pi − θ)2e2/4Aσ2 when
θ crosses threshold c/e. This is because the large investor is then able to
modify the beliefs of atomistic responsible investors about corporate social
responsibility.
We thus conclude that responsible raiders display a better financial per-
formance than non-responsible ones if θ is larger than c/e.8 The underlying
economic intuition for this result is that the raider’s social responsibility en-
ables him to credibly commit on voting adequately once he has established
a controlling position. The non-responsible raider would also like to pretend
that he is going to vote adequately in order to resell part of his holdings
at an inflated price. However, such a signal by the non-responsible raider
would not be credible since, after having pocketed the responsibility pre-
mium, voting in favor of the responsible strategy would translate into lower
returns for him. Since voting is assumed to occur after the raider has pock-
eted the responsibility premium, it would be beneficial for him to deviate
from his announced voting strategy in order to increase further his profits.
This translates into the fact that, unless the non-responsible raider can cred-
ibly commit to vote for the costly responsible strategy, he cannot replicate
the high financial performance of the responsible raider. The degree of so-
cial responsibility should thus be observable by the market in order for the
“Washing Machine” investment strategy to generate abnormal returns.
For socially responsible investors and funds, it is plausible to assume
that their pro-social orientation is known and credible. But, as discussed
in the introduction, the alliance between private equity funds, such as KKR
and TPG, with environment protection institutes, such as EDF and NRDC,
can be explained by the willingness of financially-oriented funds to enhance
the credibility of their socially responsible commitments. Such an increase
in socially responsible credibility can be beneficial when the higher market
capitalization it induces more than compensates the additional financial cost
of pursuing socially responsible strategies. This is the case when the cost of
8If there were multiple raiders, abnormal profits from the “Washing Machine” invest-
ment strategy could derive from the presence of search costs or from informational costs.
In the limiting case with perfect entry of raiders, these profits would just compensate the
costs. Following the logic of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), would-be raiders would enter
only if potential profits cover the cost of implementing the strategy.
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implementing the socially responsible strategy, investors’ risk aversion, and
the level of risk are low enough, when the level of the externality are high
enough, or when the discrepancy of the social orientation between the large
investor and the representative responsible investor is large enough.
3.2 Large investor’s engagement towards less respon-
sibility
The mechanism for corporate change that we described in the previous sec-
tion can also be directed towards less social responsibility: a raider could take
control of a firm to turn its strategy from responsible to non-responsible. We
derive in this section the circumstances in which this can happen. The inter-
pretations are symmetric so we restrict here our attention to the condition
of existence of such a scenario.
In order to characterize such equilibria, let us focus on the case in which
pi > 0.5: absent a raider’s intervention, the responsible strategy is adopted
at the shareholder-voting equilibrium. In this case, in order to buy shares
from the initial owner, the raider proposes a price:
P ∗0 = µ− c+ pie− Aσ2.
The initial owner cannot do better than accepting the offer.
At date 1, if the raider expects to be pivotal and change the firm’s strat-
egy towards less responsibility, his expected utility is given by: E1UR =
(1− α)P ∗1 + αµ − P ∗0 . The same computations as in the previous section
show that P ∗1 = µ− (1− α)Aσ2. In this case, the optimal amount of shares
that he keeps after trading at date 1 is α∗ = arg maxα E1UR = 1, that is,
the raider keeps all the shares. This is because, given his risk neutrality, it
would not make sense for the raider to sell the risky shares to risk-averse
investors. Obviously, this makes him pivotal for the firm’s decision. As ex-
plained earlier, he votes against more responsibility if θ is smaller than c/e.
This equilibrium is sustained by price P ∗1 = µ.
Proposition 5 Suppose that pi > 1/2, θ < c/e and Aσ2 ≥ pie− c. Then, the
strategic-raider equilibrium is such that
• (date 0) The initial owner sells the firm to the large investor at the low
price P ∗0 = µ+ pie− c− Aσ2;
19
• (date 1) The large investor does not sell shares at date 1, and the price
of shares is P ∗1 = µ ≥ P ∗0 . Atomistic investors do not hold any share
of the firm;
• (date 2) The large investor does not adopt the socially responsible strat-
egy;
• The equilibrium expected profit for the large investor is
E1UR = Aσ2 − (pie− c) ≥ 0. (13)
Overall, if the raider is not socially responsible in the sense that θ < c/e,
he has an interest in buying and holding the firm’s shares, and in voting for
the non-responsible strategy. By assuming that Aσ2 is larger than pie − c,
the equilibrium price P ∗0 = µ + pie − c − Aσ2 in the absence of the large
investor is smaller than µ, which is the large investor’s valuation of the firm
if he could reverse the pro-social strategy of the firm. This is actually done
by purchasing and retaining 100% of the firm’s shares.
This section shows that firms that are socially responsible might be the
targets of takeovers by non-responsible raiders. This occurs when the propor-
tion of responsible investors and the level of externality are low, and when
the cost of corporate social responsibility, investors’ risk aversion and the
level of risk are high. The idea for purely financial raiders is to profit from
the low share price that prevails for responsible firms in this case.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies asset pricing and corporate governance when some in-
vestors are socially responsible. Socially responsible investors take into ac-
count the externalities generated by a firm when making their investment
decisions. These externalities are then partially incorporated into its share
price. When investors differ in their social orientation, there is a conflict of
interest between the potential shareholders of the firm over corporate social
responsibility. To resolve this conflict, we consider that investors vote be-
tween a strategy that is financially profitable for the firm and a strategy (the
responsible strategy) which is less financially profitable in the short run but
is desirable from a social point of view.
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We first study a situation in which investors are atomistic. We determine
under what circumstances corporate social responsibility will be favored by
the shareholders of the firm. We show that this is the case if the externality
and the proportion of responsible investors are large enough, and if investors’
risk aversion and the level of risk are low enough. When it is not the case,
at equilibrium, the purely financial strategy is adopted after the vote. When
the cost of the responsible strategy is low enough, the market capitalization
of the firm is higher if it is socially responsible.
We focus on this case and study the impact of a large investor who stands
ready to acquire a pivotal stake in the firm. This large investor may acquire
the company when it is non-responsible and turn it into responsible, an
investment strategy that we name the “Washing Machine”. It enables to
sell back part of the shares at a higher price to socially responsible investors.
However, not all the shares can be sold back because the large investor has to
be pivotal at the future shareholder meetings. We show that, in addition to
such a long-term horizon, the profitability of the strategy crucially depends
on the fact that the large investor has a socially responsible orientation.
This paper offers some theoretical support to the claim that socially re-
sponsible investors can enjoy a higher stock market performance than non-
responsible investors. We show that this higher performance requires not only
to invest with a long-term perspective but also to influence the behavior of
non-responsible firms to turn them into more responsible ones. Two factors
reduce the effectiveness of the active investment strategy we describe as a tool
to improve the overall level of corporate social responsibility in the economy.
On the one hand, the strategy requires investing in non-responsible compa-
nies before making them more responsible. This includes a reputational risk
that some investors, such as large pension funds and mutual funds, are not
always willing to bear. The strategy thus appears more appropriate for al-
ternative types of investment funds such as private equity and hedge funds,
or for individual raiders. On the other hand, purely financially oriented ac-
tive investors could also implement the opposite type of investment strategy.
They could successfully acquire firms and make them less socially responsi-
ble before reselling part of their holdings on the market at a profit. Whether
activist investors will lead to more or less corporate social responsibility thus
remains an empirical question.
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